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BECAUSE SEX CRIMES ARE DIFFERENT: 
WHY MARYLAND SHOULD (CAREFULLY) ADOPT THE 
CONTESTED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 413 AND 414 
THAT PERMIT PROPENSI1Y EVIDENCE OF A CRIMINAL 
DEFENDANT'S OTHER SEX OFFENSES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the fall of 1982, a fIfteen-year-old boy named Matthew Curtis ar-
rived at Saint james School,1 an Episcopal boarding school near Ha-
gerstown, Maryland.2 A self-described "farm kid" who felt adrift 
among the more privileged students of St. james, Curtis sought solace 
in the church.3 He soon encountered Father Kenneth Behrel, the 
school's thirty-year-old chaplain, who paid special attention to Curtis, 
eventually promoting him to sacristan,4 an acolyte's highest station. 
According to Curtis, after a gradual progression of late night televi-
sion watching, foot rubbing, wine drinking, and marijuana smoking, 
he and Father Behrel began having oral and anal sex.5 The sexual 
activity, said Curtis, was not coerced,6 and continued for about two 
years. 7 This sexual activity often incorporated pornographic materials 
that Behrel kept in a footlocker in the living room of his on-campus 
apartment.8 
As an adult, Curtis found himself struggling with shame and anger 
over his relationship with Behrel, suffering from health and psycho-
logical problems, and unable to do anything with his life. 9 He eventu-
ally pressed charges against Behrel in 1998.10 
At trial in Washington County, Maryland, Behrel denied having any 
sexual contact with CurtisY Behrel further testifIed that Curtis had 
continued an amicable relationship with him after they both left St. 
james, and also produced several parishioners to vouch for his good 
character.12 
1. Behrel v. State, 151 Md. App. 64, 103,823 A.2d 696,718 (2003), ecrt. denied, 
376 Md. 546 (2003). 
2. Behrel, 151 Md. App. at 75, 823 A.2d at 702. 
3. See id. at 104-05, 823 A.2d at 719. 
4. See id. at 103, 823 A.2d at 719. 
5. Id. 
6. See id. at 105, 823 A.2d at 720. 
7. See id. at 104, 823 A.2d at 719. 
8. See id. 
9. See id. at 106-08, 823 A.2d at 720-21. 
10. Id. at 105, 823 A.2d at 719. 
11. Id. at 113, 823 A.2d at 724. 
12. Id. at 113-14, 823 A.2d at 724. 
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To bolster Curtis' credibility, the prosecution entered into evidence 
an affidavit containing the testimony of Jeffrey Miller, a former St. 
James student. 13 Miller stated that Behrel had also promoted him to 
sacristan, and had initiated a sexual relationship that progressed from 
foot rubs and wine to oral and anal sex that incorporated the porno-
graphic materials in Behrel's footlocker. 14 The trial judge admitted 
the affidavit on the ground that it described Behrel's handiwork, or 
his distinctive pattern of grooming his young acolytes for sexual 
abuse, and thus had special relevance.15 
The jury found Behrel guilty,16 but the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland vacated the conviction in May, 2003, and remanded the 
case.17 The court held that Miller's testimony was inadmissible under 
Maryland's "propensity evidence" rule, which presumptively bans any 
evidence of prior offenses used to demonstrate a defendant's propen-
sity to commit a certain type of crime. IS Though this blanket rule, 
codified in Maryland Rule 5-404(b), has a remarkable number of ex-
ceptions,l9 Miller's testimony-despite its high credibility and over-
whelming similarity to Curtis' allegations-did not neatly fit into any 
of them.20 
The Behrel reversal is no anomaly. It illustrates the fact that, sound 
as Maryland's antiquated "propensity rule" might be in other contexts, 
it fails to provide justice for the victims in many sex offense cases.21 
Unlike victims of, say, carjacking or assault, many sex crime victims 
are, like Matthew Curtis, steeped in shame and particularly reluctant 
to come forward publicly.22 This secrecy ensures that most sex crimes 
yield no witnesses and little physical evidence.23 This is especially true 
in child sex abuse cases, which often distill down to a credibility con-
test between an adult abuser and a frightened, easily discredited 
child.24 Furthermore, the ban on propensity evidence is especially 
strict in Maryland, where Rule 5-404(b) is construed more narrowly, 
13. See id. at 78, 823 A.2d at 704. 
14. See id. at 80-81, 823 A.2d at 705. In a subsequent and separate trial, another 
Washington County jury convicted Behrel of sexually abusing Miller. Id. at 
75, 823 A.2d at 702. Curtis testified briefly at Miller's trial, but not about 
his own alleged sexual relationship with Behrel. Id. at 139, 823 A.2d at 739. 
15. See id. at 121-22, 823 A.2d at 729. ' 
16. Id. at 75, 823 A.2d at 702. The jury's task was facilitated by evidence that 
police had seized a footlocker at Behrel's apartment years later that was full 
of pornographic material, sexual aids and nude photographs. See id. at 78-
81, 823 A.2d at 704-05. 
17. Id. at 76, 823 A.2d at 702. 
18. See id. at 130-32, 823 A.2d at 734-35. 
19. See infra note 36. 
20. See Behrel v. State, 151 Md. App. 64, 131-32, 823 A.2d 696, 735 (2003). 
21. See infra Part II.B (discussing other Maryland sex crime cases applying Rule 
5-404 (b) ). 
22. See infra Part lILA. 
23. See infra Part lILA. 
24. See infra Part lILA. 
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and - perhaps less consistently, than its counterpart mother 
jurisdictions.25 
Recognizing this obstacle to achieving justice in child sex abuse 
cases, Maryland Delegate Pauline Menes of Prince George's County 
and Maryland Senator Jennie Forehand of Montgomery County spon-
sored a bill in January 2004 that would facilitate admissibility of other 
sex offenses as propensity evidence in trials of child molesters.26 The 
proposed statute, which effectively creates a "propensity evidence" ex-
ception in Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-404 (b), is modeled after Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 414,27 but provides additional safeguards for 
defendants.28 
Although two Maryland General Assembly committees shelved the 
proposed bill in the 2004 legislative session,29 this comment will ex-
plain why the Maryland General Assembly should not only amend the 
propensity rule for child sex abuse cases, but also ultimately adopt a 
modified version of the federal adult sex crime rule as well.30 The 
discussion will begin with an explanation of the long-standing ban in 
Anglo-American law against propensity evidence and how that rule is 
applied in Maryland.31 Next, it will present an overview of Federal 
Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415,32 in addition to the statutes of 
25. See infra Part II.B. 
26. For the General Assembly's 218th session in 2004, the bill numbers were 
H.B. 401 and S.B. 718. See infra note 29. One of the original proponents of 
the bill is Dr. Robert Wack, director of the Carroll County Pediatric Sexual 
Assault Forensic Examination Clinic (SAFE), whose experience testifying 
on behalf of sexually abused children convinced him that the rule barring 
evidence of a sex abuser's past victims disserviced young victims. (Notes on 
file with author.) 
27. See infra note 98 for text of FED. R. EVID. 414. Note that Maryland legisla-
tors did not propose to adopt the two companion rules, 413 and 415, which 
allow propensity evidence in sex offense crimes against adults, and in civil 
sexual harassment trials, respectively. See infra notes 97, 99. 
28. See H.D. 401, 2004 Leg., 218th Sess. (Md. 2004), available at http://mlis. 
state.md.us/2004rs/bills/hb/hb040lf.rtf; see also S. 718, 2004 Leg., 218th 
Sess. (Md. 2004), available at http://mlis.state.md.us/2004rs/bills/sb/ 
sb0718f.rtf (providing safeguards that include advance notice to the defen-
dant of the evidence's proposed use at trial, a closed hearing on the evi-
dence's admissibility, and judicial discretion as to the circumstances of 
admissibility) . 
29. The Maryland House Judiciary Committee rejected House Bill 401 on 
March 27, 2004. Maryland Assembly Bill Status and Information, H.D. 401, 
2004 Leg., 218th Sess. at http://mlis.state.md.us/2004rs/billfile/hb0401. 
htm (last modified Aug. 10, 2004). On April 15, 2004 the Senate Judicial 
Proceedings Committee gave an unfavorable report to Senate Bill 718. Ma-
ryland Assembly Bill Status and Information, S. 718, 2004 Leg., 218th Sess., 
at http://mlis.state.md.us/2004rs/billfile/sb0718.htm (last modified Aug. 
10, 2004). 
30. Admissibility of sex crime evidence in civil cases is outside the scope of this 
comment. 
31. See discussion infra Parts III.A,B. 
32. See discussion infra Part II.C. 
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the ten states that have adopted some version of these rules.33 The 
comment will then discuss the four most compelling reasons for 
adopting the amended rules in sex crimes cases,34 followed by a dis-
cussion, based on how other jurisdictions have implemented these 
rules, of how the five main fears of opponents are unjustified. 35 
II. BACKGROUND FACTS AND LEGAL DOCTRINES 
A. Maryland's Ban on Propensity Evidence Is Remarkably Elastic 
Maryland's common law ban on propensity evidence is codified in 
Maryland Rule 5-404 (b) , which provides in relevant part that 
"[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove 
the character of a person in order to show action in conformity there-
with."36 In other words, evidence admitted only to prove a defen-
dant's bad character, or propensity to commit certain types of crime, 
is inadmissible. Like its counterparts in other jurisdictions and Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 404(b), upon which it is modeled, Maryland's 
rule has evolved from the long-standing Anglo-American principle 
that information about a defendant's other crimes would so repel or 
confuse jury members that they would ignore the merits of the case at 
bar and unfairly punish the defendant for his evil nature.37 The fear 
is that, for example, ajury might decide that a man accused of catjack-
ing is probably guilty since he was convicted of robbing a pawn shop 
three years ago. 
33. See discussion infra Part II.D. 
34. See discussion infra Part lILA-D. 
35. See discussion infra Part III.E. 
36. MD. R. EVID. 5-404(b). The rule continues: "It may, however, be admissible 
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, prepara-
tion, common scheme or plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake 
or accident." [d. 
37. See, e.g., Lynn McLain, "Other Acts" Evidence: Recent Decisions lry the Court of 
Appeals Undermine the Efficacy of Maryland Rule 5-404(b), 31 U. BALT. L.F. 5, 6-
7 (2000) (describing history of propensity rule); United States v. Enjady, 
134 F.3d 1427, 1430 (10th Cir. 1998), explaining: 
The state may not show defendant's prior trouble with the law, spe-
cific criminal acts, or ill name among his neighbors, even though 
such facts might logically be persuasive that he is by propensity a 
probable perpetrator of the crime. The inquiry is not rejected be-
cause character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too 
much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge 
one with a bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to 
defend against a particular charge. The overriding policy of ex-
cluding such evidence, despite its admitted probative value, is the 
practical experience that its disallowance tends to prevent confu-
sion of issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice. 
Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1430 (quoting Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 
475-76 (1948». 
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Despite the strong language of this principle and its indignant de-
fenders,38 the propensity rule is nonetheless riddled with a remarka-
ble number of exceptions.39 Recognizing that some evidence is 
simply too relevant and probative to keep out,40 Maryland's propen-
sity rule allows evidence of other crimes to be admitted if it is "sub-
stantially relevant to some contested issue in the case."41 The second 
sentence of Maryland Rule 5-404(b) codifies eight possible excep-
tions: proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, common 
scheme or plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or acci-
dent.42 These exceptions are also widely used in federal and other 
jurisdictions under which the evidence may be deemed "substantially 
relevant," and thus admissible.43 In addition to these enumerated ex-
ceptions, Maryland courts have created several additional common 
law exceptions for "substantial relevance."44 The propensity rule, in 
short, is eminently elastic.45 
Furthermore, as its broad title suggests, the rule on "other crimes, 
wrongs, or acts"46 encompasses a wide range of misconduct.47 In Ma-
ryland, as elsewhere, this includes not only convictions/8 but other 
"bad" acts that are not necessarily crimes,49 as well as uncharged of-
38. A defender of the existing propensity evidence rule stated that "[ the pro-
posed bill] is trying to turn over 300 years of jurisprudence." Del. Menes' 
Proposal: Hearing on H.D. 401 Before the Md. House Judiciary Comm., 
2004 Leg., 218th Sess. (2004) (quoting statement of a Baltimore City crimi-
nal defense attorney). 
39. See Oesby v. State, 142 Md. App. 144, 160-61, 788 A.2d 662, 671-72 (2002) 
(detailing Maryland's exceptions to Rule 5-404(b) and noting that the cate-
gories often overlap). 
40. See McLain, supra note 37, at &-7. 
41. Behrel v. State, 151 Md. App. 64, 124,823 A.2d 696,731; Harris v. State, 324 
Md. 490, 500, 597 A.2d 956, 961 (1991). 
42. MD. R. EVID. 5-404(b). 
43. See FED. R. EVlD. 404(b); see also Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664, 669-70, 350 A.2d 
680,684 (1976). 
44. Behrel, 151 Md. App. at 124-25, 823 A.2d at 731. 
45. See id. at 125, 823 A.2d at 731; see also McLain, supra note 37, at 7. 
46. MD. R. EVID. 5-404(b). 
47. See, e.g., Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988) (stating that 
FED. R. EVID. 404(b) applies in both civil and criminal cases and generally 
pertains to any extrinsic act that might adversely reflect on the actor's char-
acter); United States v. Cooper, 577 F.2d 1079, 1087-88 (6th Cir. 1978) 
(stating that FED. R. EVID. 404(b) is not limited only to evidence of other 
crimes, but rather its broad language includes "any conduct of the defen-
dant which may bear adversely on the jury's judgment of his character"). 
48. See, e.g., Whitehead v. State, 54 Md. App. 428, 436, 458 A.2d 905, 909-10 
(1983) (allowing admission of defendant's prior convictions for purposes 
of impeaching defendant). 
49. See, e.g., Synder v. State, 361 Md. 580,585,762 A.2d 125, 128 (2000) (noting 
that evidence showing defendant and murder victim had stormy relation-
ship is admissible to show motive under MD. R. EVlD. 5-404 (b) ); Duckworth 
v. State, 323 Md. App. 532, 544, 594 A.2d 109, 114 (1991) (upholding, 
under the absence of mistake exception in Rule 5-404 (b), the admission of 
evidence that defendant, who was on trial for accidentally shooting a three 
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fenses50 and acquittals.51 It also includes convictions that happened 
prior to, concurrent with,52 or after53 the charges in the defendant's 
current trial. 
Such evidence is not automatically admitted, hqwever. A three-step 
approach, first articulated in 1989 in State v. Faulkner,54 governs the 
admissibility of other crimes evidence. First, the trial court must de-
termine if the evidence fits within one or more of the pre-existing 
exceptions to the rule. If so, the trial court must determine whether 
the accused's involvement in the other crimes is established by clear 
and convincing evidence.55 Finally, the trial court must use its discre-
tion to balance the probative value of the other crimes evidence 
against any unfair prejudice likely to result from its admission.56 This 
last test has been codified into Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-403, 
which provides that "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if 
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by consid-
erations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence."57 
year old with a BB gun, of an earlier incident in which the defendant had 
also accidentally shot the victim with a BB gun). 
50. See, e.g., State v. Faulkner, 314 Md. 630, 642-43, 552 A.2d 896, 902 (1989) 
(upholding the admission of evidence of three prior uncharged burglaries 
in defendant's burglary trial under the modus operandi exception); see also 
Anaweck v. State, 63 Md. App. 239, 257, 492 A.2d 658,667-68 (1985), rev'd 
on other grounds, Wynn v. State, 351 Md. 307, 718 A.2d 588 (1998) (uphold-
ing admission in drug trial of evidence about defendant's prior uncharged 
drug sales). 
51. See Wise v. State, 47 Md. App. 656, 669-70, 425 A.2d 652, 660 (1981) (stating 
that evidence of an act that resulted in an acquittal is admissible under 
"other crimes" law, but is subject to judicial scrutiny). 
52. See, e.g., Oesby v. State, 142 Md. App. 144, 157, 788 A.2d 662, 669 (2002) 
(holding that evidence of rapes of three other victims within a nine-day 
period, each of which had separate but roughly concurrent trials, were all 
admissible in the rape trial of a fourth victim since the crimes were similar 
enough to fit under the modus operandi exception to Rule 5-404 (b) ). 
53. See, e.g., United States v. Hadaway, 681 F.2d 214, 217 (4th Cir. 1982) (apply-
ing FED. R. EVID. 404(b) and stating that "subsequent conduct may be 
highly probative of prior intent"). 
54. 314 Md. at 634-35, 552 A.2d at 898. 
55. See id. This standard is much higher than its federal counterpart, FED. R. 
EVlD. 404(b), which requires only that the other crimes evidence be admit-
ted "if there is sufficient evidence to support a finding by the jury that the 
defendant committed the similar act." Huddleston v. United States, 485 
U.S. 681, 685 (1988) (rejecting a preponderance of the evidence standard 
for evidence admitted under FED. R. EVlD. 404(b) exceptions). 
56. Faulkner, 314 Md. at 634-35,552 A.2d at 898; see also Behre1 v. State, 151 Md. 
App. 64, 124-25,823 A.2d 696, 730-31 (2003) (citing an updated version of 
the three-step test in which MD. R. EVID. 5-403 replaces the common law 
probative value balancing test in the third prong of the Faulkner test). 
57. MD. R. EVlD. 5-403. 
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B. Yet, Despite the Numerous Exceptions, Much Sex Crimes Evidence Still 
Does Not Fit Through Maryland s Propensity Rule 
Although all the exceptions fuel the popular perception that, as 
one Maryland trial judge stated, "you can drive a Mack truck through 
5-404(b) ,"58 the high courts of Maryland seem to feel otherwise. 59 In-
deed, in 1991 the Court of Appeals of Maryland emphasized that Rule 
5-404(b) should be one of exclusion-not inclusion-and its excep-
tions applied only after much scrutiny.60 Furthermore, Chief Justice 
Joseph Murphy of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland acknowl-
edged that Maryland's rule on propensity evidence "is more pro-de-
fense than the rules in many jurisdictions, including the federal 
rules."61 
Given the rule's somewhat schizophrenic elastic-but-exclusive na-
ture, it is not surprising that it continues to be murkily interpreted 
and inconsistently applied.62 This is especially true in sex crimes 
cases, where Maryland's rule is so narrowly drawn it excludes an enor-
mous amount of sex crimes evidence-even more so than in other 
jurisdictions with a similar rule.63 The unfortunate result, as Dr. 
Wack64 and other sex crime victim advocates testified in Annapolis in 
February and March, 2004, is that many of Maryland's repeat sex of-
fenders escape conviction, in part because highly relevant and proba-
tive evidence of their other crimes simply does not appear before the 
jury.65 
1. Maryland's Exception for Sex Crime Evidence Is Unusually 
Narrow 
The first distinguishing feature of Maryland's 5-404(b) application 
is the unusual narrowness of its sex crime exception.66 Formally 
58. Telephone Interview with the Honorable James J. Lombardi, Associate 
Judge, Prince George's County Circuit Court, 7th Judicial Circuit, Md. (Jan. 
10, 2004) (notes on file with author). 
59. See, e.g., Harris v. State, 324 Md. 490, 494-95, 597 A.2d 956, 959 (1991). 
60. See id. "We have re-examined the principles governing admissibility of evi-
dence of other bad acts and have considered the current legal literature 
discussing the "inclusionary" and "exclusionary" approaches to the prob-
lem .... [W]e conclude that continued adherence to the "exclusionary" 
approach is appropriate." Id. 
61. Honorable Joseph Murphy, Comments to his Evidence class at the Univer-
sity of Baltimore School of Law (Mar. 31, 2004) (notes on file with author). 
62. See, e.g., McLain, supra note 37. 
63. See discussion infra Part II.D for sex crime exceptions in other states. 
64. See supra note 26. 
65. In addition to Dr. Wack, veteran Maryland child protection advocate Ellen 
Mugmon and Lisae C. Jordan, legislative counsel for the Maryland Coali-
tion Against Sexual Assault, were among those who testified during the 
2004 legislative session about the evidentiary holes in 5-404(b) that allow 
repeat sex offenders to escape punishment. (Notes on file with author.) 
66. MD. R. EVlD. 5-404(b); see also discussion infra Part II.B. 
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adopted in 1989, the long-standing common law exception admits evi-
dence to show the accused's propensity for illicit sexual relations, but 
only of the same type and with the same victim.67 In Acuna v. State, 68 
for example, the Court of Appeals of Maryland upheld the admission 
of testimony of a four-year-old girl that a neighbor-who the girl's 
mother caught about to perform cunnilingus on the child-had per-
formed oral sex on the girl at least ten other times.69 
Had the defendant in Acuna performed similar acts on other neigh-
borhood girls, that evidence would not have been admissible in Mary-
land.70 Such was the result in State v. Werner,7I for example, where the 
Maryland court of appeals affirmed the court of special appeals' rever-
sal of a conviction of a Baltimore man who was indicted for molesting 
all three of his stepdaughters on the ground that the trial court had 
wrongly admitted the oldest victim's testimony about the sexual abuse 
of her younger sister. 72 The trial court had originally allowed the 
girl's testimony about the abuse of her younger sister because it ex-
plained what propelled her to finally come forward and expose her 
stepfather,73 but the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that witness 
rehabilitation was not appropriate in this case,74 and there was no 5-
404(b) exception under which the girl's testimony was otherwise 
admissible.75 
The Werner result would be an aberration elsewhere; most of the 
other states that have carved out a common law exception for other 
sex crimes allow evidence of a sex offender's other victims, especially 
in child molestation cases.76 In fact, admission of such evidence was, 
historically, more the rule than the exception. 77 In the early 1920s 
about half the states had "lustful disposition" or "depraved instinct" 
exceptions to admit propensity evidence of statutory rape, sodomy, or 
child molestation. 78 Common law "lustful disposition" or other sex 
67. Vogel v. State, 315 Md. 458, 466, 554 A.2d 1231, 1234 (1989) (stating: "Our 
acceptance of the exception is not to be taken as meaning that we adopt a 
~ro.ad 'sexu~! propensity' exception to the general rule .... It is strictly 
hmned .... ). 
68. 332 Md. 65, 629 A.2d 1233 (1993). 
69. [d. at 75-76, 629 A.2d at 1238. 
70. See id. at 75, 629 A.2d at 1238. 
71. 302 Md. 550, 489 A.2d 1119 (1985). 
72. [d. at 565, 489 A.2d at 1127. 
73. [d. at 554, 489 A.2d at 1121. 
74. [d. at 562-63, 489 A.2d at 1125. 
75. [d. at 557, 489 A.2d at 1122-23. 
76. Kansas, Mississippi and Virginia, like Maryland, are among the few states to 
limit their sex crime exceptions to the same victim. See State v. Crossman, 
624 P.2d 461, 462 (Kan. 1981); Mitchell v. State, 539 So. 2d 1366, 1372 
(Miss. 1989); Moore v. Commonwealth, 278 S.E.2d 822; 825 (Va. 1981). 
77. See United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 881 (10th Cir. 1998). 
78. [d. See also Thomas J. Reed, Reading Gaol Revisited: Admission of Uncharged 
Misconduct },vidence in Sex Offender Cases, 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127, 171-81 
(1993). 
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crime exceptions remain in at least nine other jurisdictions-Arkan-
sas, Washington, D.C., Georgia, Indiana, Nebraska, North Carolina, 
Oregon, West Virginia, and Wisconsin-whose legislatures have not 
otherwise codified the exception.79 
2. Maryland's Propensity Rule, 5-404(b) Is Inconsistently Applied 
The second principal reason that Maryland's propensity rule ex-
cludes an enormous amount of sex crimes evidence is that the rule is 
confusing, inconsistently applied, and often misunderstood.so "Mary-
land judges exclude a lot of 5-404(b) evidence in sex offense cases," 
said one former Maryland sex crimes prosecutor, "either because they 
don't really understand the rule or because they're afraid of being 
overturned on appeal."Sl Given the murkiness of the rule's applica-
tion, it is not surprising that the trial judge in Behrel admitted that he 
did not know under which 5-404(b) exception Mitchell's evidence fit, 
stating instead that he was admitting the evidence because "there 
79. See, e.g., Mosley v. State, 929 S.W.2d 693, 695 (Ark. 1996) (upholding admis-
sibility in trial of a man accused of raping his nineteen-year-old daughter of 
evidence that he had been convicted of raping his six-year-old stepdaughter 
years before);Johnson v. United States, 610 A.2d 729,730 (D.C. 1992) (up-
holding admissibility, in trial against defendant's sex crimes against three 
teenaged girls, of evidence of defendant's prior sexual abuse of two other 
teenaged girls to show his "unusual sexual preference"); Goins v. State, 571 
S.E.2d 195 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (affirming admission offacts underlying a 
prior conviction for rape, sodomy and sexual abuse, as relevant to lustful 
disposition); Kuchel v. State, 501 N.E.2d 1032, 1033 (Ind. 1986) 
("[E]vidence of former similar offenses is admissible in sex crimes involving 
a 'depraved sexual instinct' [such as child molestation] whereas it is not per 
seadmissible in a rape case .... "); State v. Stephens, 466 N.W.2d 781, 785-86 
(Neb. 1991) (upholding trial court's admission, in the trial of a man con-
victed of raping his one-month old granddaughter, of evidence that he had 
also repeatedly molested his stepdaughter from age four to fourteen); State 
v. Reeder, 413 S.E.2d 580, 583 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) (allowing 'other 
crimes' evidence to show defendant's "unnatural lust, intent or state of 
mind"); State v. Fears, 688 P.2d 88,90 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (allowing modus 
operandi evidence to rebut a defense of consent in sex crimes cases); State v. 
Parsons, 589 S.E.2d 226, 234 (W. Va. 2003) ("Collateral acts or crimes may 
be introduced in cases involving child sexual assault or sexual abuse victims 
to show the perpetrator had a lustful disposition towards the victim, a lust-
ful disposition towards children generally, or a lustful disposition to specific 
other children .... "); State v. Fishnick, 378 N.W.2d 272, 277-78 (Wis. 1985) 
(upholding admissibility against man convicted of raping three-year-old girl 
of evidence that man had, one week prior to incident, molested a thirteen 
year old and exposed himself to a twelve-year-old girl). 
80. See generally McLain, supra note 37. See, e.g., infra note 84, discussing how 
two Maryland appellate courts differ in defining the modus operandi 
exception. 
81. Telephone Interview with Adam Rosenberg, former Assistant State's Attor-
ney for Baltimore City, Sex Offense Division (July 7, 2004) (notes on file 
with author). 
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seems to be a niche within the rules that creates an exception for testi-
mony such as this."82 
There is no such niche in Maryland law. Although, as in Behrel, the 
State may try to admit evidence of an accused's other molestation vic-
tims under the "common scheme" exception of 5-404(b), the rule 
does not consistently permit it.83 Maryland appellate courts generally 
hold "common scheme" to mean either: (1) modus operandi, or distinc-
tive pattern of doing things that suggests the handiwork or signature 
of the accused, which is usually only used when the defendant's iden-
tity is in doubt;84 or (2) a plan to commit an offense as part of a grand 
scheme to commit others, such as a theft of nitroglycerine for use in 
blowing open a safe.85 
Thus, in Maryland, evidence of a defendant's pattern of sexual con-
tact with one child, such as Father Behrel's abuse of Miller, is not 
admissible under "common scheme" to prove evidence of very similar 
conduct with a different victim, such as Curtis.86 The Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland reached a similar result in McKinney v. State, 
where it reversed the conviction of an adult male camp counselor for 
sexually touching three prepubescent girls in a three-day period on 
the ground that the sex crime evidence did not fit under any 5-404(b) 
exceptions-including the "common scheme" exception-and thus 
the trials of the three girls had been improperly joined.87 
Similarly, in Reidnauer v. State,88 the court reversed the conviction of 
a man for raping two prostitutes on two separate occasions after both 
women testified that the defendant had driven them to his place of 
employment, penetrated them vaginally and anally with Vaseline, and 
82. Behre1 v. State, 151 Md. App. 64, 122,823 A.2d 696, 729 (2003). 
[The Court found that the evidence] does fit within a niche, and 
I'm not sure what it should be called, whether it's identity, oppor-
tunity, preparation, identical method earmarking of the handy 
work [SlC] of the accused, whatever you may want to call it, there 
seems to be a niche within the Rules that creates an exception for 
testimony such as this, once again, to allow the State to show the 
identical method of the grooming of young men, fifteen years of 
age, under the circumstances presented here for the abuses alleged 
in this case. 
ld. 
83. See id. at 128-29, 823 A.2d at 733-34 (discussing "common scheme" rule in 
the instant case and others). 
84. See Oesby v. State, 142 Md. App. 144, 161-62, 788 A.2d 662, 672 (2002) 
(stating that modus operandi evidence is generally only used when the iden-
tity of the accused is in doubt, although Maryland courts have not been 
consistent on this issue); but see Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664, 670, 350 A.2d 
680, 684 (1976) (listing modus operandi as a propensity rule exception in its 
own right, independent of its use to prove identity). 
85. McKinney v. State, 82 Md. App. 111, 124,570 A.2d 360, 366 (1990). 
86. See Behrel, 151 Md. App. at 130, 823 A.2d at 734. 
87. See McKinney, 82 Md. App. at 128, 570 A.2d at 368. 
88. 133 Md. App. 311, 755 A.2d 553 (2000). 
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told them he had AIDS.89 The court reversed on the ground that the 
crimes were not admissible together under the "common scheme" ex-
ception, and thus the cases had been improperly joined.90 
Such results, however, seem to lack logic, because the crimes in 
those cases seem similar enough that the evidence should, as the trial 
judge in Behrel noted, fit under some 5-404(b) exception.91 Indeed, 
courts in other jurisdictions have historically admitted such similar 
pattern evidence under the "common scheme" or other 5-404(b) ex-
ception, although not always predictably or consistently.92 Such legal 
manipulation is still commonplace in those jurisdictions, like Mary-
land, that have not yet clarified their sex crimes exceptions.93 Mary-
land's current law on admission of sex crime evidence resembles the 
uneven, ad hoc state of admissibility of sex crimes evidence that was 
present among the states and federal courts a decade ago; it excludes 
a great deal of highly relevant sex crimes evidence, or results in appel-
late litigation when the trial courts admit that evidence. 
c.. Recognizing the Limits of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to Admit Sex 
Crimes Evidence, Congress Enacted Federal Rules 413, 414, and 415 
Fueled in part by frustration over similar inconsistencies inherent in 
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), U.S. Senator Robert Dole and Rep-
resentative Susan Molinari proposed rules in 1994 that would allow in 
evidence of a serial molester or rapist's prior victims.94 As Senator 
Dole stated: "[W] hen someone is out there committing sex crime af-
ter sex crime ... it is this Senator's view that this evidence should be 
admitted at trial without a protracted struggle over whether the evi-
89. Id. at 315-16, 755 A.2d at 555. 
90. See id. at 315, 755 A.2d at 555. 
91. See Behre~ 151 Md. App. at 122, 823 A.2d at 729. 
92. See, e.g., David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, "Other Crimes" Evidence in Sex 
Offense Cases, 78 MINN. L. REv. 529, 560-61 (1994) (citing decades-old his-
tory of legal manipulation to admit "other crimes" evidence in sex offense 
cases, and stating that, in general, the unpredictable and ad hoc admission 
of sex crime evidence is still a common basis for reversal of trial court 
decisions) . 
93. See, e.g., Bowden v. State, 538 So. 2d 1226, 1233 (Ala. 1988) (emphasizing 
that Alabama courts recognize no formal sex crime exception, but also ap-
proving the courts' practice of liberalizing admission of prior sexual abuse 
evidence under the "other purposes" exceptions of ALA. R. EVlD. 404(b)); 
State v. Bros., 564 S.E.2d 603, 607 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that North 
Carolina's appellate courts are "markedly liberal" in admitting evidence of 
similar sex offenses under N.C. R. EVlD. 404(b)); State v. Cramer, Nos. 
76663, 76664, 2000 WL 1144975, at *2-3 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2000) 
(allowing, in trial of stepfather accused of sexually abusing his stepdaugh-
ter, evidence of defendant's prior abuse of his niece under opportunity, 
identity, preparation and plan exceptions to OHIO R. EVlD. 404(b)). 
94. 140 CONGo REc. H5437-03 (daily ed. June 29, 1994) (statement of Rep. 
Molinari, who traced a brief history of the proposed rules). 
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dence has been properly admitted under Rule 404(b) or some other 
exception. "95 
July 9, 1995 was the effective date of Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 
414, and 415, which liberalize the admission of evidence of an accused 
person's other sexual misconduct or sex offenses.96 The rules cover a 
broad range of cases: Federal Rule of Evidence 413 applies in criminal 
cases of sexual assault;97 Rule 414 applies to child sex abuse cases;98 
and Rule 415 applies to civil cases.99 
The federal rules, in effect, codify a ninth exception to Rule 404(b) 
by allowing evidence of an accused's other sex offenses to be admitted 
to show his propensity to commit that type of crime. 100 Such evidence 
is not automatically admitted, however. The rules do not allow such 
evidence in dissimilar or unrelated crimes, such as kidnappings or 
burglaries. 101 Although not specifically stated in the rules, the courts 
must subject Rules 413, 414 and 415 to the probative value verses un-
fair prejudice balancing test of Federal Rule of Evidence 403.102 
The overall goal of the new rules, according to Representative 
Molinari, is to protect the public from repeat rapists and child molest-
ers.103 Congress passed the rules in response to the growing public 
perception that recidivist child molesters and rapists were going un-
95. 
96. 
97. 
98. 
99. 
100. 
101. 
102. 
103. 
139 CONGo REc. S15,137-38 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1993). 
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, § 320935(d), 108 Stat. 1796. 
FED. R. EvlO. 413(a). Rule 413 reads in relevant part: "In a criminal case in 
which the defendant is accused of an offense of sexual assault, evidence of 
the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses of sexual assault 
is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which 
it is relevant." Id. 
FED. R. EVlO. 414(a). Rule 414 reads in relevant part: "In a criminal case in 
which the defendant is accused of an offense of child molestation, evidence 
of the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses of child mo-
lestation is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter 
to which it is relevant." [d. 
FED. R. EvlO. 415(a). Rule 415 reads in relevant part: 
[d. 
In a civil case in which a claim for damages or other relief is predi-
cated on a party's alleged commission of conduct constituting an 
offense of sexual assault or child molestation, evidence of that 
party's commission of another offense or offenses of sexual assault 
or child molestation is admissible and may be considered as pro-
vided in Rule 413 and Rule 414 of these rules. 
See United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326, 1329 (lOth Cir. 1998) (stating 
that Federal Rule 413 supersedes Rule 404(b)'s general restriction on pro-
pensity evidence, and allows the government to offer evidence of defen-
dant's prior sexual misconduct for the purpose of demonstrating his 
propensity to commit the charged offense). 
LYNN MCLAIN, 5 MARYLAND EVIDENCE: MARYLAND EVIDENCE, STATE & FED-
ERAL § 413.2 at 874-76 (2001). 
United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1431 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating, "The 
legislative history ... indicates that the district court must apply Rule 403 
balancing and may exclude such evidence in an appropriate case."). 
See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
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punished because juries do not hear of relevant past offenses. 104 This 
perception was formed by several highly-publicized events in the 
1990s, such as the rape trials of William Kennedy Smith and boxer 
Mike Tyson, and the rape/murder of nine-year-old Megan Kanka by a 
repeat sex offender. lo5 
The Kennedy Smith case illustrates the utility of Federal Rule 413, 
which addresses the past behavior of adult "date rape" defendants, 
who are often viewed with more sympathy than their victims. 106 
Smith, a nephew of U.S. Senator Ted Kennedy, was acquitted in De-
cember, 1991 107 of allegedly tackling and raping a young woman who 
had given him a ride back to his family's Palm Beach compound after 
meeting at a nearby nightclub.108 Absent from the jury's deliberations 
were the sworn statements of three other women who alleged sexual 
attacks by Smith that were similar to that alleged by the Palm Beach 
victim. 109 The trial judge excluded this evidence without comment,110 
ostensibly because the attacks did not fit under Florida's then-existing 
exceptions to the propensity rule, which mirror those currently in ef-
104. See, e.g., David]. Karp, Evidence of Propensity and Probability in Sex Offense Cases 
and Other Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REv. IS, lS-16 (1994) (discussing impetus 
for Federal Rules 413-1S); Sherry L. Scott, Fairness to the Victim: Federal Rules 
of Evidence 413 and 414 Admit Propensity Evidence in Sexual Offender Trials, 3S 
Hous. L. REv. 1729, 1731-32 (1999) (discussing impetus for Federal Rules 
413-1S). 
105. See Jeffrey Waller, Federal Rules of Evidence 413-15: "Laws Are Like Medicine; 
They Generally Cure an Evillry a Lesser . .. Evil," 30 TEX. TECH. L. REv. IS03, 
IS0S-07 (1999) (summarizing several high-profile sex-offense cases that 
predated the adoption of Federal Rules 413-1S). 
106. Studies show that-absent corroborating evidence-both female and male 
jurors are often unfairly prone to disbelieve adult rape victims. See, e.g., 
Scott, supra note 104, at 1743. 
107. Florida v. Smith, No. 91-S482CFA02 (Fla. Palm Beach County Ct. Dec. 11, 
1991) at http://oris.co.palm-beach.f1. us/ or_web 1 / details.asp?doc_id=S 7S1 
689&file_num. 
108. See Mary Jordan, Jury Finds Smith Not Guilty of Rape; Quick Verdict Ends Emcr 
tional Legal Battle, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 1991, at AI; Mary Jordan, Smith's 
Tearful Accuser Tells of Yelling 'Stop!'; Alleged Victim Testifies at Rape Trial, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 1991, at AI. The victim, the stepdaughter of a wealthy 
Florida businessman, testified that after she gave Smith a ride home she 
accompanied him into the house, where she saw Senator Edward Kennedy 
and his son. She then went for an amorous walk along the beach with the 
seemingly gentlemanly Smith, who suddenly attacked her, knocked her to 
the ground and raped her, saying "no one is going to believe you." Id. Too 
distraught to drive after the attack, she called a friend for a ride home. Id. 
109. Mary Jordan, 3 Women in Affidavits Accuse Smith of Sex Attacks; Statements De-
scribe Alleged Assaults in Graphic Detail: 'Ferocious ... Almost Animal-Like,' 
WASH. POST,July 23,1991, at AS (all three women described Smith inviting 
them to one of the Kennedy's impressive homes under some pretext, then 
physically tackling and raping, or trying to rape, them); see also Rick Hamp-
son, Experts Say Judge Had to Exclude Other Women, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 
13, 1991, at D6. 
110. See Hampson, supra note 109, at D6. 
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feet in Maryland. lll Without that additional evidence, the trial be-
came a credibility contest between a well-spoken doctor from a 
prominent family and a single mother portrayed by the defense as a 
histrionic nut who was angry after a night of love gone bad.112 The 
jury quickly decided in favor of Mr. Kennedy Smith. 113 
D. Adoption of the Rules in Other States 
Minus the celebrity and media attention, of course, the essential 
elements of the Kennedy Smith rape trial are found in every jurisdic-
tion: accuser, accused, possibly forced sex, no witnesses, scant physical 
evidence. In response, the legislatures of ten states have, as of June, 
2004, adopted their own versions of Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 
414, and 415.11 4 Five of these states-Alaska, Arizona, California, Col-
orado, and Illinois-have embraced all three of the rules' provisions, 
enacting comprehensive laws that allow in evidence of a defendant's 
other sex crimes in child molestation, criminal sexual offense, and 
civil sexual offense cases.115 Five other states-Florida, Indiana, Loui-
siana, Missouri, and Texas-have enacted rules (somewhat like those 
proposed in the 2004 session of the Maryland General Assembly) that 
allow in such evidence only for sexual offenses against minors.116 In-
cluding the nine states that have carved out common law exceptions 
to their propensity rules for sex crimes,117 a total of 19 states plus all 
the federal courts overtly recognize an exception for sex crimes 
evidenceY8 
111. Compare FLA. STAT. ch. 90.404(2) (a) (1991): 
Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible 
when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, including, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible 
when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or 
propensity. 
with MD. R. EVlD. 5-404(b). 
112. See A Day-try-Day Account of Courtroom Proceedings, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 
12,1991, at A7;Janet Cawley, Smith Denies Rape, Says Sex 'Completely Mutual,' 
CHI. TRIB., Dec. 11, 1991, at Cl; Mary Jordan, Smith Defense Calls It an 'Act of 
Love'; Rape Trial opens After Key State Evidence Is Ruled Inadmissible, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 2, 1991, at AS. 
113. Chris Lavin, Smith Acquitted of Rape; Jury Out Just 77 Minutes, ST. PETERSBURG 
TIMES, Dec. 12, 1991, at AI. 
114. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text. 
115. ALAsKA R. EVlD. 404(b); ARIz. R. EVID. 404(c); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-
1420 (West 2001); CAL. R. EVlD. §§ 1101, 1108; COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-
10-301 (West 2003); 725 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/115-7.3 (West 2002). 
116. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.404(2)(b)(l) (West 1999 & Supp. 2004); IND. CODE 
ANN. § 35-37-4-15(a) (Michie Supp. 1998); LA. CODE EVlD. ANN. art. 412.2 
(West 2004); Mo. ANN. STAT. !§ 566.025 (West Supp. 2004); TEX. CRIM. 
PRoc. CODE ANN. § 38.37 (Vernon Supp. 2004). 
117. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
118. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text. 
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III. WHY MARYlAND NEEDS A HEIGHTENED PROPENSI1Y 
RULE 
Why should Maryland follow the trend towards liberalizing admis-
sion of other crimes in sex offense cases? Why should such evidence 
be preferentially admitted over, for example, past evidence of drunk 
driving charges? The primary reasons, discussed below, are summa-
rized in this portion of the preamble to Colorado's statute: 
[S] exual offenses are a matter of grave statewide concern. 
These frequently occurring offenses are aggressive and as-
saultive violations of the well-being, privacy, and security of 
the victims ... [and] result in serious and long-lasting harm 
to individuals and society. These offenses often are not re-
ported or are reported long after the offense for many rea-
sons ... [and] usually occur under circumstances in which 
there are no witnesses except for the accused and the victim, 
and, because of this and the frequent delays in reporting, 
there is often no evidence except for the conflicting testi-
mony. Moreover, there is frequently a reluctance on the part 
of others to believe that the offenses occurred.119 
A. Nature of Sex Offenses Means There Are Almost Never Witnesses, and, 
Due to Delay in Reporting, Often No Physical Evidence 
The most compelling argument for liberalizing admission of a de-
fendant's prior sex crimes is that such crimes often take place in se-
cret, leaving no witnesses. Fear and shame prevent victims from 
reporting, thus there is often no current physical evidence.12o Since 
the parties often know each other, the sex is "consensual," and may 
leave no bruises or scars.121 The result is that, as in the Kennedy 
Smith and Behrel trials,122 sex offense cases often result in a credibil-
ity contest between two parties, between whom there is usually a great 
disparity of power. 123 In urging the adoption of the federal rules, 
Representative Molinari characterized many rape trials as "unresolv-
able swearing matches."124 This characterization is especially true of 
many child sex abuse cases.125 
119. 
120. 
12l. 
122. 
123. 
124. 
125. 
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-10-301(1) (West 1998). 
See Karp, supra note 104, at 20-2l. 
See supra notes 7, 14 and accompanying text. 
See supra notes 107-13 and accompanying text (discussing Kennedy Smith 
trial); see also Behrel v. State, 151 Md. App. 64, 130-31,823 A.2d 696,734 
(2003) (stating: "The central issue here was whether the abuse occurred at 
all, and the strength of the State's case rested largely on the jury's assess-
ment of Curtis's credibility and Behrel's veracity."). 
See, e.g., 140 CONGo REc. H23,603 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (quoting state-
ment of Rep. Molinari, characterizing many rape trials as "un resolvable 
swearing matches"). 
Id. 
See, e.g., 2001 Fla. Laws ch. 2001-221(1), which provides that: 
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B. Damage to Victims, Especially Children, Is Unique 
A second compelling reason for Maryland to treat sex crime evi-
dence differently is that rape and incest, although crimes of violence, 
have a particularly psychological dimension.126 Sex crimes confuse 
something private and intimate with something criminal, and often 
cause shame and stigma for the victim greater than that associated 
with any other crime.127 Furthermore, the effects are often life-
long.128 These effects of child abuse can be devastating and also quite 
costly. For example, at sentencing proceedings in death penalty cases, 
one often hears that the defendant was abused as a child.129 Bringing 
perpetrators of child sex abuse to justice can help stop the chain of 
abuse and thus serve strong public policy interests.130 
C. High Number of Victims for Repeat Offenders and Strong Evidence that 
Repeat Offenders Will Strike Again 
The high number of victims, combined with the probability that 
many sex offenders will commit other sex offenses, is the third main 
justification for the new rules. Sex offenders are unique: other 
criminals usually do not commit sex offenses.131 In fact, the Depart-
ment of Justice reported in 2003 that sex offenders are four times 
126. 
127. 
128. 
129. 
130. 
131. 
[I]n cases of child sexual abuse, the credibility of the victim is fre-
quently a focal issue of the case, and 
... [E]vidence which shows that an accused child molester has 
molested children at other times may be relevant to corroborate 
the victim's testimony, and 
... [E]vidence which shows that an accused child molester has 
molested children at other times may have a probative value which 
outweighs its prejudicial effect. 
David L. Corwin et. aI., Modem History of Child Sexual Abuse Awareness: Cycles 
of Discovery and Suppression, 17 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 7, 9, 18 (1993). 
ld. at 10. 
See, e.g., Behrel v. State, 151 Md. App. 64, 10M)8, 823 A.2d 696, 720-21 
(2003). The court recounted a recorded telephone conversation in which 
the adult Curtis confronts Behrel, saying: 
ld. 
You know, I've spent fifteen years believing that it was my fault, and 
that I was dirty and nasty .... [M]y life has been basically over 
since the end of [the abuse]. You know .... I'm thirty-two years 
old, and I'm trying to move on with my life, and I can't close this 
chapter of my life without speaking with you about it . . . . I want 
my power back. You took it all away from me. 
Memorandum in Support of H.D. 401 from Professor Lynn McLain of the 
University of Baltimore School of Law, to Maryland Representative Joseph 
P. Vallario, Chair of House Judiciary Committee (Feb. 20, 2004) (on file 
with author). 
See WILLIAM E. PRENDERGAST, SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 
78-79 (Continuum Publishing 1996); see also Kevin M. Wallis, Perspectives on 
Offenders, in FROM VICTIM TO OFFENDER 1, 10-11 (Freda Briggs ed., 1995). 
See Lucy Berliner, Sex Offenders: Policy and Practice, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 1203, 
1208, n.41 (1998). 
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more likely than any other released prisoner to commit a sex crime. 132 
Common sense indicates that a strong compulsion to rape strangers 
or molest children is not something that disappears on its own, with-
out extensive treatment. As Representative Molinari stated, "a history 
of [child molestation in a defendant] tends to be exceptionally proba-
tive because it shows an unusual disposition of the defendant-a sex-
ual or sado-sexual interest in children-that simply does not exist in 
ordinary people."133 As Chief Judge Richard Posner of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted as dicta in one 
case, propensity evidence and motive evidence overlap in sex crime 
cases because "[m]ost people do not have a taste for sexually mo-
lesting children ... [and] as between two suspected molesters, then, 
only one of whom has a history of such molestation, the history estab-
lishes a motive that enables the two suspects to be distinguished."134 
The principle is simple: several prior instances of violent behavior are 
often an important indicator of future violent tendencies. 135 
It should be noted, however, that no conclusive data proves that 
most sex offenders are exceptional recidivists, i.e. that they are more 
likely to commit another sex offense than a murderer is to commit 
another murder. 136 Because sex crimes are vastly underreported,137 
and sex crime recidivism samples vary widely,138 recidivism rates range 
from an improbably low 2.5% for rapists to as high as 77% for a sub-
group of core pedophiles.139 Most studies place the baseline range 
from about 20% to 45% for both rapists and child molesters.14o 
132. PATRICK A. LANGAN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFEND-
ERS RELEASED FROM PRISON IN 1994, at 12 (2003), available at http://www. 
ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf. 
133. See 140 CONGo REc. H23,603 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994). 
134. United States v. Cunningham, 103 F.3d 553, 556 (7th Cir. 1996). 
135. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357-58 (1997) (upholding the 
Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act and stating that "previous instances of 
violent behavior are an important indicator of future violent tendencies."). 
136. See infra notes 137-39 and accompanying text. 
137. CENTER FOR SEX OFFENDER MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., RECIDIVISM OF 
SEX OFFENDERS 3 (2001), available at http://www.csom.org/pubs/recid-
sexof.pdf. 
138. Id. at 2 (noting that sex offender subgroups, definition of recidivism, and 
length of study all yield very different results). 
139. See supra note 132, at 8 (showing that 2.5% of released rapists out of 
272,111 former inmates from fifteen states, including Maryland, were ar-
rested for another rape within three months of release), available at http:! / 
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/rpr94.pdf; see also Eric S. janus & Paul E. 
Meehl, Assessing the Legal Standard for Predictions of Dangerousness in Sex Of 
fender Commitment Proceeding, 3 PSVCHOL. PUB. POL'y & L. 33, 54, 57, nn. 125, 
134 (1997) (citing R. KARL HANSON ET AL, OTTAWA: CORRECTIONS BRANCH, 
MINISTRY OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL OF CANADA, LONG-TERM FOLLOW-UP OF 
CHILD MOLESTERS: RISK PREDICTORS AND TREATMENT OUTCOME 22 (1992) 
(noting a 77% recidivism rate among a subgroup of incarcerated child 
molesters) . 
140. See janus, supra note 139, at 51. 
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Nonetheless, the fact that "all fifty states, the District of Columbia, 
and the federal government have adopted some form of sex offender 
registration or community notification programs"141 is further evi-
dence that a link between sex offenders and recidivism is widely recog-
nized. Finally, even more compelling is the fact that studies 
consistently show that many convicted child molesters each have com-
mitted numerous, even hundreds, of sex offenses that are never re-
ported or punished. 142 
D. The Federal Rules Are Consistent with the Trend of Focusing on the Ac-
tions of Sex Crime Defendants, Not the Alleged Consent of Sex Crime 
Victims 
The 1995 federal rules continue the evidentiary trend of focusing 
on the perpetrators, rather than the victims, of sexual violence. 143 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit noted that 
this trend is reflected in the state and federal rape shield statutes,144 
which, like Federal Rule of Evidence 413, encourage "rape reporting 
and increased conviction rates by directing the jury's attention to the 
defendant."145 
Federal Rule of Evidence 413 also "limits the prejudice to the victim 
that often results from jurors' tendencies to blame victims" in sex of-
fense cases. 146 Even victims in sex crimes involving children are 
placed under far more scrutiny than defendants because, among 
other things, "there is a general notion that kids lie to get out of being 
punished, and also the fact that people simply don't want to believe 
these things happen."147 
E. Why the Worst Fears of Critics Are Unfounded: Congressional and State 
Responses 
Despite these arguments, many believe that the federal rules and its 
spin-offs are ill-conceived and dangerous to defendants' civil liber-
ties.148 Yet these fears are largely unfounded for several reasons: 1) 
141. Young v. State, 370 Md. 686, 692 n.3, 806 A.2d 233, 236 n.3 (2002). 
142. See Scott, supra note 104, at 1740; see also LANGAN, supra note 132, at 1-2. 
143. See United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1432 (lOth Cir. 1998). 
144. Rape shield statutes generally prohibit a sexual assault victim's prior sexual 
history from being a subject of inquiry in a trial against the accused. See, 
e.g, FED. R. EVlD. 412. 
145. Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1432. 
146. [d. 
147. Telephone Interview with Adam Rosenberg, former Assistant State's Attor-
ney for Baltimore City, Sex Offense Division (July 7, 2004) (notes on file 
with author). 
148. Scott, supra note 104, at 1735; Waller, supra note 105, at 1521-23. Even 
several co-sponsors of Maryland's proposed House Bill attacked those who 
had come to testifY on the bill's behalf at a House Judiciary Committee 
Hearing on February 19, 2004. Personal observation of the hearing on 
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the rules are not as new as they soundl49: some evidence that critics so 
fear, such as allegations of uncharged prior sex offenses, is already 
allowed in under current Maryland law,150 albeit inconsistently; 2) the 
rules contain time-tested procedural safeguards that successfully bal-
ance the rights of the accused with those of the accuser;151 and 3) 
some of the fears rest on nothing more than deep anxiety about sex in 
general, and an unwarranted fear of false rape allegations in 
particular. 152 
1. The Federal Rules Are Constitutional 
The main criticism against the rules is that, by creating an excep-
tion to the propensity rule, they violate the due process clause of the 
Fifth Amendment, which guarantees defendants a fair trial.153 Critics 
charge that the jury will be so prejudiced by the other offenses-espe-
cially in the case of a child molester-that they will convict based on 
their outrage, not on the facts related to the current charge, thus vio-
lating the defendant's right to a fair trial.154 The constitutionality of 
the federal rules, however, has been upheld. The first court to do so 
was the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in United 
States v. Enjady.155 In Enjady, a rape defendant, who resided on a Na-
tive American reservation, appealed his conviction on the ground that 
Federal Rule of Evidence 413 violated the Fifth Amendment by al-
lowing the trial court to admit testimony of another woman who said 
he had raped her two years earlier. 156 
The court upheld the constitutionality of the rules for five reasons. 
First, although the ban on propensity evidence is a long-standing prin-
ciple, it is not embedded in the Constitution.157 Second, Rules 413-
415 allow other victims to corroborate the complainant's account, 
which is important in crimes that often leave no witnesses.158 As the 
court stated, "[b] roader admissibility of prior rapes places before the 
jury evidence that the defendant 'lacks [the] moral inhibitions that 
would prevent him from committing rapes' and implies that the 
H.D. 401 before the House Judiciary Committee during the 418th session 
of the 2004 General Assembly. (Notes on file with author.) 
149. See Karp, supra note 104, at 23. 
150. See Behrel v. State, 151 Md. App. 64, 125-26,823 A.2d 696, 730-31 (2003); 
see also Oesby v. State, 142 Md. App. 144, 163-64, 788 A.2d 662, 673 (2002). 
151. See Scott, supra note 104, at 1736-38. 
152. See infra Part III.E.5. 
153. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
154. See Karp, supra note 104, at 222; see also Scott, supra note 104, at 1738-39. 
155. 134 F.3d 1427. 
156. Id. at 1429. 
157. Id. at 1432 ("Many procedural practices-including evidentiary rules-that 
have long existed have been changed without being held unconstitutional. 
The enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence and subsequent amend-
ments are examples."). 
158. Id. 
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threat of criminal sanctions has not deterred the defendant in the 
past."159 Third, "[c]orroboratory information about the defendant 
also limits the prejudice to the victim that often results from jurors' 
tendencies to blame victims in acquaintance rape cases."160 Fourth, 
"like rape shield statutes codified in the federal and state rules of evi-
dence, Rule 413 encourages rape reporting and increased conviction 
rates by directing the jury's attention to the defendant."161 Fifth, the 
requirement that courts apply a Federal Rule of Evidence 403 balanc-
ing test provides adequate due process for the defendant.162 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld 
the constitutionality of Federal Rule of Evidence 414 in United States v. 
Castillo. 163 In admitting several uncharged allegations of a father's 
sexual abuse of his two daughters, the Castillo court echoed the rea-
sons from the Enjady court, and also added two more. 164 One, that 
the common law "lustful disposition" exception historically applied in 
so many states favors the idea that Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415 
stand on firm notions of fairness in trial. 165 Two, the rules are also 
subject to Federal Rule of Evidence 402, which requires relevancy.166 
The Castillo court also rejected the defendant's somewhat far-fetched 
arguments that the rules violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendmene67 and the Eighth Amendment prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment.168 
The Castillo court also addressed the commonly stated concern that, 
as one Maryland defense attorney complained to the Maryland Gen-
eral Assembly, once juries hear about a defendant's prior sex offenses, 
the trial is a "slam dunk" win for the prosecution.169 For this argu-
ment to hold true, stated the Castillo court, 'Juries would have to ig-
nore courts' instructions to them that they consider only the crime 
charged in deciding whether to convict."170 The court noted: "A cen-
tral assumption of our jurisprudence is that juries follow the instruc-
159. Id. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. at 1432-33. 
163. 140 F.3d 874 (10th Cir. 1998). 
164. Id. at 881-82. 
165. Id. at 881. 
166. Id. at 882. 
167. Id. at 883 (stating that the rational basis test was met by the government's 
"need for corroborating evidence in cases of sexual abuse of a child be-
cause of the highly secretive nature of these sex crimes and because often 
the only available proof is the child's testimony"). 
168. Id. at 884. 
169. Personal observation of the hearing on H.D. 401 before the House Judici-
ary Committee during the 418th session of the 2004 General Assembly. 
(Notes on file with author.) 
170. Castillo, 140 F.3d at 884. The court noted, "The rule does not impose crim-
inal punishment at all; it is merely an evidentiary rule." Id. 
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tions they receive."171 A former Maryland sex crimes prosecutor 
echoes the sentiment that juries generally heed such instructions: 
"[I]fyou get prior acts in, defense counsel has a great argument lined 
up that you can't convict based onjust these prior bad acts, which may 
make it harder for a jury to convict because, in my experience, they 
may overcompensate and not want to convict based on that."172 
2. Admitting Uncharged Offenses Does Not Unfairly Prejudice the 
Defendant Because, Not Only Are Uncharged Offenses Routinely 
Admitted Now, but the Sex Crime Rules Contain Special Procedu-
ral Safeguards Absent Elsewhere 
Some critics are alarmed that Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415 
and their state counterparts allow admission of evidence of uncharged 
offenses. 173 There are at least five reasons why there is no need for 
alarm. First, evidence of uncharged offenses is already allowed in 
under Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-404(b) .174 There is nothing new 
about this. 
Second, in Maryland, evidence of uncharged allegations must meet 
a stringent clear and convincing evidentiary standard. I75 This is 
stricter than the federal rules. I76 Maryland's evidentiary standard was 
met in Acuna v. State, for example, where the court held that a four-
year-old girl's descriptions of prior acts of oral sex by her stepfather 
were admissible since the detail provided by the girl was specific 
enough and so inappropriate for her age that it met the clear and 
convincing standard of proof of admissibility.In 
On the other hand, the standard also keeps out unsound allega-
tions. Florida Statute 90.404(2) (b) (1),178 which codifies that state's 
version of Federal Rule of Evidence 414 but, unlike the federal rule, 
171. Id. 
172. E-mail from Adam Rosenberg, former Assistant State's Attorney for Balti-
more City, Sex Offense Division, to the author (July 7, 2004) (on file with 
author). 
173. See, e.g., Jeffrey G. Pickett, The Presumption of Innocence Imperiled: The New 
Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415 and the Use of Other Sexual-Offense Evidence in 
Washington, 70 WASH. L. REv. 883, 884, 899 (1995). 
174. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text (discussing uncharged of-
fenses, bad acts, acquittals and other non-<:onvictions currently admissible 
under Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-404 (b) ); see also MD. R. EVlD. 5-404 (b). 
175. Acuna v. State, 332 Md. 65, 72, 629 A.2d 1233, 1236 (1993); Vogel v. State, 
315 Md. 458,467',554 A.2d 1231, 1235 (1989). 
176. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (discussing the Huddleston 
standard) . 
177. Acuna, 332 Md. at 76, 629 A.2d at 1238. 
178. FlA. STAT. ANN. § 90.404(2) (b) (1) (West Supp. 2004) provides: "In a crimi-
nal case in which the defendant is charged with a crime involving child 
molestation, evidence of the defendant's commission of other crimes, 
wrongs, or acts of child molestation is admissible, and may be considered 
for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant." 
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imposes a clear and convincing standard on uncharged allegations, 179 
provides a good example for Maryland. The standard was not met in 
a case involving a 41-year-old man accused of statutory rape of a 13-
year-old girl. ISO The trial judge ruled inadmissible testimony that de-
fendant had fondled a 13-year-old girl who was staying at his house 
eight years previously, because the authorities had not found enough 
evidence to charge the defendant when the girls reported the inci-
dent eight years ago.1S1 
Third, judicial gloss on the federal rules requires that uncharged 
offenses must be similar to the crime charged.1s2 For example, in 
United States v. LeCompte,lS3 the court allowed evidence showing the 
defendant's abuse of his first wife's young niece closely resembled his 
pattern of game playing, exposure, and touching with his second 
wife's young niece. 1s4 The case law in most jurisdictions does not sup-
port the fear that an unrelated sexual allegation, such as the at-
tempted rape of an adult woman, will be allowed into the trial of a 
defendant charged with fondling a young boy.1s5 
Fourth, uncharged offenses in Maryland (and under the federal 
rules) must still pass the balancing test for probative value verses un-
fair prejudice of Rule 5_403.1S6 In applying its federal counterpart, 
Rule 403, the federal courts consider the following factors in sexual 
assault cases: 
1) [H] ow clearly the prior act has been proved; 2) how pro-
bative the evidence is of the material fact it is admitted to 
prove; 3) how seriously disputed the material fact is; and 4) 
whether the government can avail itself of any less prejudi-
cial evidence. When analyzing the probative dangers, a 
court considers: 1) how likely is it such evidence will contril>-
179. Audano v. State, 641 So. 2d 1356, 1358-59 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994). 
180. [d. 
181. [d. (stating that" [w]e agree that the collateral accusations were not estab-
lished by clear and convincing evidence. The stories were inconsistent .... 
Although a conviction is not a prerequisite for admission of evidence of 
other crimes, no offense was charged. The authorities did not believe the 
girls' stories at the time.") (citations omitted). 
182. United States v. LeCompte, 131 F.3d 767, 769 (8th Cir. 1997); United States 
v. Meachem, 115 F.3d 1488, 1495 (lOth Cir. 1997). 
183. 131 F.3d 767 (8th Cir. 1997). 
184. LeCompte, 131 F.3d at 768. 
185. Georgia is one of the only states that liberally (perhaps too liberally) allows 
evidence of unrelated sexual allegations into child molestation cases. See, 
e.g., Davis v. State, 517 S.E.2d 808, 812 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (evidence of 
prior inappropriate conversations held relevant to lustful disposition); Bar-
rett v. State, 559 S.E.2d 108, 110 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (prior requests for 
anal sex with wife held relevant in prosecution involving anal sex with a 
minor, despite differences between the acts, including age of other party 
and presence or absence of consent). 
186. See United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1431 (10th Cir. 1998); see also 
State v. Faulkner, 314 Md. 630, 635, 552 A.2d 896,898 (1989). 
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ute to an improperly-based jury verdict; 2) the extent to 
which such evidence will distract the jury from the central 
issues of the trial; and 3) how time consuming it will be to 
prove the prior conduct.187 
Clearly, not all uncharged allegations make it through these proce-
dural hurdles. 188 When Maryland courts apply Rule 5-403, case law 
requires them to perform the Rule 5-403 analysis on the record ex-
plaining the reasoning underlying admission or exclusion of the un-
charged offense.189 This ensures that the Rule 5-403 analysis is 
deliberate and allows the appellate court to determine whether the 
rule has been properly applied.190 
Finally, Federal Rules 413-415 require prosecutors to give fIfteen 
days advance notice to defendants regarding specillc evidence of 
other sex offenses prosecutors will submit, giving defendants time to 
prepare a full rebuttal. 191 This notice requirement does not exist 
under Maryland Rule 5-404(b) .192 Therefore, the federal rules pro-
vide greater procedural protection to the defendant than if the defen-
dant was charged with an offense that was not of a sexual nature. 193 
3. Remote Claims Are Not Necessarily Unfair to the Defendant, and 
the Judge May Use Discretion in Admitting Such Claims 
Critics of the proposed sex crime exception are also alarmed that 
evidence of very old convictions or allegations may be allowed into a 
sex offender's trial, since the new rules have no time limit.194 Again, 
however, there is nothing new about admitting remote claims; Mary-
land courts have done so for decades. 195 Since there is no statute of 
limitations on murder cases or child sex abuse cases, Maryland rules 
of evidence have long allowed in rape or murder claims dating back 
decades, as long as they are relevant for other purposes. l96 In 
187. 
188. 
189. 
190. 
191. 
192. 
193. 
194. 
195. 
196. 
Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1433. 
See, e.g., United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326, 1331-32 (10th Cir. 1998) 
(excluding testimony of other patients who alleged the doctor had inappro-
priately touched them, under Rule 413 in the doctor's sexual harassment 
trial because the testimony was deemed overly prejudicial under Rule 403). 
Streater v. State, 352 Md. 800, 810, 724 A.2d Ill, 116 (1999). 
See id. 
FED. R. EVID. 413(b), 414(b), 415(b); Karp, supra note 104, at 18. 
See MD. R. EVlD. 5-404(b). 
See Karp, supra note 104, at 24-25. 
See, e.g., 140 CONGo REc. S10,277 (daily ed. Aug. 2,1994) (statement of Sen. 
Biden expressing concern that allowing "unsubstantiated testimony about 
something that could have happened-any thing-from the day before to 
50 yea~~ before into a trial ... absolutely violates every basic tenet of our 
system. ). 
See McLain, supra note 101, § 404.5, at 645-46. 
See, e.g., State V. Faulkner, 314 Md. 630, 642-43, 552 A.2d 896, 902 (1989) 
(finding "other crimes" evidence of two robberies that were three and four 
years old was probative and admissible on the limited issue of identity); 
Hoes V. State, 35 Md. App. 61, 63-65, 368 A.2d 1080, 1082-83 (1977) (evi-
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Merzbacher v. State,197 testimony from several adults who had allegedly 
been terrorized and sexually assaulted by a sadistic high school 
teacher twenty years prior was admitted to help explain why the adult 
prosecuting witness had waited so long to come forward. 19B 
Under Federal Rule 414, which deals with child molestation, the 
courts must liberally admit evidence of prior sex crimes, regardless of 
age, because the information may be especially probative.199 In United 
States v. Meachem,200 where the defendant was charged with abusing a 
female relative, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit admitted 
testimony from two other adult relatives that their stepfather fondled 
them thirty years earlier.20l The testimony was admitted to rebut the 
defendant's testimony that he had never sexually touched his step-
daughters when they were under the age of fourteen. 202 The court 
agreed with the prosecution that the evidence was probative because 
both events occurred when the defendant was a mature man, the de-
fendant had apparently not sought treatment for his proclivities, and 
the patterns of abuse were sufficiently similar that the defendant was 
not unfairly prejudiced.203 
Nonetheless, courts are free to decide if very old claims may be un-
fair to the defendant. In United States v. Larson,204 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit admitted testimony, under Federal Rule 
of Evidence 414, from two adult men about the defendant's alleged 
sexual abuse of them sixteen to twenty years earlier, but excluded tes-
timony from another alleged victim whose abuse had occurred twenty 
to twenty-one years earlier.205 Without explaining exactly why, the 
court said that the latter allegations were simply too remote in time to 
be fair to the defendant.206 
Ultimately, the matter of remote claims will be one of discretion, 
and the court may choose to exclude such a claim, if, for example, the 
other incidents occurred when the defendant was a minor, or the act 
charged was recent and the other crimes very remote.207 Alterna-
tively, if remote claims are admitted, the jury will still ultimately de-
dence that the defendant shot the victim twice in the side four or five years 
earlier was admissible to show specific intent that the subsequent shooting 
of the victim was not likely to be an accident). 
197. Merzbacher v. State, 346 Md. 391, 697 A.2d 432 (1997). 
198. Id. at 409, 697 A.2d at 44l. 
199. United States v. Meachem, 115 F.3d 1488, 1491-92 (lOth Cir. 1997). 
200. 115 F.3d 1488 (lOth Cir. 1997). 
201. Id. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. at 1492-93. 
204. United States v. Larson, 112 F.3d 600 (2d Cir. 1997). 
205. Id. at 602. 
206. Id. 
207. See, e.g., Harris v. State, 324 Md. 490, 501, 597 A.2d 956,962 (1991) (refus-
ing to admit remote evidence in trial for recent drug sale). 
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cide how much weight it wants to accord possibly stale testimony of 
old claims.208 
4. The Rules Will Not Unduly or Unfairly Dilute or Delay the 
Proceedings 
Critics also protest that the rules will create a trial within a trial, thus 
causing undue delay and prejudice to the defendant.209 Yet, again, 
courts are accustomed to dealing with evidence of uncharged acts.210 
Pretrial hearings are commonly held at the request of either party to 
try to obtain an advance ruling against admitting certain evidence.211 
Furthermore, Maryland's proposed rule specifically provides that 
other act evidence must be presented in a closed hearing to protect 
against the jury hearing evidence that the judge might find to be un-
fairly prejudicial.212 The same kind of procedure is followed now in 
Maryland when other crimes evidence is offered under Rule 5-
404(b).213 
Furthermore, if the judge finds other crimes evidence to be highly 
relevant and helpful, taking the time to hear it will be worthwhile. 
Indeed, that ruling might lead to a plea bargain, and actually save the 
court's time. 
On the other hand, the trial judge may decide that the additional 
testimony and witnesses may simply overburden the current proceed-
ings. This was the case in United States v. Guardia,214 where the judge 
excluded testimony from additional patients in a doctor's sexual mis-
conduct trial.215 The rationale was that the additional witnesses would 
"transform [a] trial of two incidents into [a] trial of six incidents, each 
requiring description by lay witnesses and explanation by expert wit-
nesses," and thus slow down the trial.216 
5. The Rules Will Not Let in a Disproportionate Share of False Alle-
gations and Mere Rumors Because of Safeguards 
Whether spoken or not, many critics fear that the new rules will fuel 
false rape claims. One opponent of the new rule, testifying before the 
Maryland House Judiciary Committee on February 19, 2004, worried 
that the proposed bill would allow pre-teen girls, angered because 
they had not been selected to dance in Swan Lake, to concoct a story 
208. 
209. 
2lO. 
211. 
212. 
213. 
214. 
215. 
216. 
See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 902 (1983) (noting that juries 
decide how much weight to give evidence). 
See Karp, supra note 104, at 22. 
See Karp, supra note 104, at 20-22. 
See Karp, supra note lO4, at 21-22. 
See McLain, supra note 129. 
See McLain, supra note 129. 
United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326 (lOth Cir. 1998). 
Id. at 1332. 
Id. 
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that their dance teacher had molested them, and secure a conviction 
based on their joint testimony.217 
Such a scenario, however, has no logical connection to the pro-
posed rules. Police, prosecutorial, and judicial discretion, which are 
unaltered by the new rules, are designed to minimize bogus claims 
long before they ever get to trial. Such hurdles arguably make it hard 
enough for one false claimant to successfully litigate her fabricated 
story;218 it would be even more difficult for two or three false claim-
ants to consistently maintain their fake "Swan Lake" claims through 
the entire judicial process. While some false rape reports nonetheless 
prevail,219 the proposed rules of evidence would not make such a re-
sult more likely. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Due to the secretive and highly damaging nature of sex crimes, and 
the fact that these trials often come down to a swearing match be-
tween grossly unequal parties, Maryland should override its aversion 
to evidence of prior sex offenses to prove a defendant's propensity to 
commit future crimes, and adopt Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 
414, along with their procedural safeguards that ensure fairness to de-
fendants. As Maryland Attorney GeneralJoseph Curran stated in voic-
ing his support for House Bill 401, the new rule would remove a 
"plainly unjust bar against the admission of relevant information in 
sexual child abuse prosecutions."220 Curran underscores the fact that 
"entrusting the admissibility determination to the trial court's discre-
217. 
218. 
219. 
220. 
Personal observation of the hearing on H.D. 401 before the House Judici-
ary Committee during the 418th session of the 2004 General Assembly. 
(Notes on file with author.) 
See, e.g., David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal Justice Sys-
tem, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1300 (1997) (suggesting that, 
among the many women who eventually drop rape charges, some may do 
so because of "a dawning realization that a false report of rape is a danger-
ous business"). No reliable data exists on how many women drop charges 
because they were false to begin with, since many police departments clas-
sify as "unfounded" those rapes that are either falsely alleged, or those with 
insufficient testimony, or whose victims decide to drop charges. See, e.g., 
Del Quentin Wilber, Police Figures on Rape in Error, BALT. SUN, Dec. 3, 2003, 
at lB. 
There is no consensus on the actual number of false rapes reported to the 
police. Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 218, at 1298 (citing the conven-
tional, but not unanimous, wisdom that "the proportion of false reports [of 
rape] is negligible, perhaps as low as 2%, a figure said to be comparable to 
that for most other crimes."). 
Letter from Attorney General Joseph Curran to Del. Joseph Vallario, Chair 
of House Judiciary Committee (Feb. 23, 2004) (on file with author). 
2004] Because Sex Crimes Are Different 129 
tion ensures that only highly probative and reliable evidence is al-
lowed and safeguards against any unfair prejudice."221 
Joyce R Lombardi 
221. Id. 
